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Abstract
Whilst the history of the Indian diaspora after independence has been
the subject of much scholarly attention, very little is known about non-
Indian migrants in India. This paper traces the fate of Arabs, Afghans and
other Muslim migrants after the forcible integration of the princely state
of Hyderabad into the Indian Union in 1948. Because these non-Indian
Muslims were doubly marked as outsiders by virtue of their foreign birth
and their religious affiliation, the government of India wished to deport
these men and their families. But the attempt to repatriate these people
floundered on both political and legal shoals. In the process, many were left
legally stateless. Nonetheless, migrants were able to creatively change the way
they self-identified both to circumvent immigration controls and to secure greater
privileges within India.
Introduction
The middle of the twentieth century witnessed a transition from an
era which was characterized by the relatively free movement of people
within the British Empire to a period in which postcolonial nation-
states attempted to control flows of migrants more closely. This change
left migrants across the former British Empire in an anomalous and
often disadvantaged position: Indians in South Africa had limited
political rights; the bulk of Indians in Ceylon acquired the nationality
of neither India nor Ceylon; Indians resident in Burma who did not
∗ This research has been generously funded by the UK’s Arts & Humanities
Research Council. I would like to thank Eleanor Newbigin and Omar Khalidi for
their comments on an earlier draft of this paper.
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wish to become Burmese citizens after independence there were made
to register and apply for permits to stay; South Asians in Malaya who
left the country after independence in 1957 risked being refused re-
entry.1 At some point in the early postcolonial period many of these
countries experienced what might be called a crisis of citizenship, in
which the breaking of imperial bonds of migration, trade and finance
was proffered as the solution to a wide variety of postcolonial ills. Thus,
General Ne Win put pressure on Indians to leave Burma in 1962,2
Kenya placed restrictions on the rights of Indians in the late 1960s,3
and Idi Amin expelled Asians from Uganda in 1972.4 Much less is
known, however, about the fortunes of people of non-Indian origin in
India.5 The following pages track the fate of Arabs, Afghans and other
groups of Muslim migrants in Hyderabad after this princely state was
forcibly integrated into the Indian Union in September 1948.
In the interregnum between independence and the introduction of
the Indian Constitution on 26 January, 1950, the government of India
took practical steps to ensure that the actual movement of people
into India was restricted.6 This included the introduction of permits
and, later, passports for those travelling between Pakistan and India.7
Moreover, shortly after independence Afghans in India were required
to be in possession of passports.8 In Hyderabad the Military Governor
and the unelected ministry sought to send many people of non-Indian
origin to their ‘home’ countries.
This paper tracks the government of India’s plan to repatriate these
men and their families and makes three main arguments. First, it
suggests that, for India, the shift from empire to nation-state was
1 Hugh Tinker, ‘Indians Abroad: Emigration, Restriction and Rejection’ in Michael
Twaddle (ed.), Expulsion of a Minority: Essays on Ugandan Asians (London: The Athlone
Press for the Institute of Commonwealth Studies, University of London,1975), pp.15–
29.
2 Ibid.
3 Daniel Rothchild, ‘Kenya’s Minorities and the African Crisis over Citizenship’,
Race (London), vol. 9, no. 4 (1968), pp. 421–37.
4 Twaddle, Expulsion of a Minority.
5 cf. Ellen Oxfeld, Blood, Sweat andMahjong: Family and Enterprise in an Overseas Chinese
Community (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993).
6 Joya Chatterji, ‘Partition, Migration and Citizenship in South Asia, 1946–2006’
paper presented at workshop, From Subjects to Citizens (4 September 2008).
7 Vazira Fazila-Yacoobali Zamindar, The Long Partition and the Making of Modern
South Asia: Refugees, Boundaries, Histories (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007),
Chapters 3 and 5.
8 Departmental note by B. K. Kapur, 19 May, 1948, National Archives of India
(hereafter NAI), Ministry of States (hereafter MoS), f.59-H/48.
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complicated not only by the huge migrations of partition, but by the
presence of significant numbers of Indians in other British colonies and
migrants from the Empire in India. This meant that the government
of India’s calculations about its citizens were never confined within the
country’s boundaries. Of course, India was not unique in this respect.
Just as other historians have suggested, this research argues that the
fact of migration was central to the process by which the Indian nation
was demarcated.9
However, and this is the second argument, formal legal questions
of citizenship and residency were reliant upon more informal, on the
ground negotiations over the meaning of nationality and the nature of
belonging. The shift towards a world of nation-states precipitated the
emergence of a legal regime governing nationality in former British
colonies that often conflicted with precisely those ethnic conceptions
of belonging that had given rise to the demand for independence
in the first place. In principle, this new legal framework required
documentary evidence to prove one’s citizenship, including birth
certificates and passports, in order to establish the right to enter a
country either for travel or to work.10 Whilst the existing literature
places great stress on the importance of this documentary regime,
this paper argues that, in practice, the authorities were heavily
dependent upon both the self-identification of individuals and the
everyday understandings of belonging, even for the production of
these documents. Thus, this research engages with scholars who have
noted the dissonance between a formal rhetoric of secularism and
informal attitudes and practices which excluded Muslims from the
Indian nation.11 It extends this particular question to ask whether
Muslims of Afghan and Arab origin could hope to retain any sense of
belonging in postcolonial India.
9 Radhika Viyas Mongia, ‘Race, Nationality, Mobility: a History of the Passport’,
Public Culture, vol. 11, no. 3, (1999), pp. 527–535.
10 This framework had been developing since the nineteenth century. On the
history of the passport, and the regulation of migration see, John Torpey, The Invention
of the Passport: Surveillance, Citizenship and the State (Cambridge, Cambridge University
Press, 2000); Marilyn Lake and Henry Reynolds, Drawing the Global Colour Line: White
Men’s Countries and the International Challenge of Racial Equality (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2007).
11 Gyanendra Pandey, ‘Can a Muslim be an Indian?’, Comparative Studies in Society
and History, vol. 41, no. 4 (1999), pp. 608–629. More recent work has suggested that
even formally secular legal regimes tended to be structured in ways that served the
interests of Hindu men, see, Eleanor Newbigin, ‘The Codification of Personal Law and
Secular Citizenship: Revisiting the History of Law Reform in Late Colonial India’,
Economic and Social History Review, vol. 46, no. 1 (2009), pp. 83–104.
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Third, and finally, the following pages trace the fortunes of individu-
als who were excluded from India either by informal understandings
or legal regimes, but who were also excluded from their so-called
‘home’ countries. Many people whom the authorities wished to deport
were simply rejected by their home country because they failed to
fulfil the documentary requirements to prove their citizenship. It
appears that these men and women were left stateless. But this did
not mean that they were rendered helpless or trapped between states.
On the contrary, individuals often circumvented immigration controls,
changed the way they self-identified for their own ends, and used their
alien status to try to better their position in India.
Hyderabad and its place in the imperial economy of migration
Notions of nationality and subjecthood within the British Empire
had been a rather untidy tangle of local and imperial rules,12 but in
practice everyone within the empire (with some important exceptions,
including slaves) enjoyed the freedom to live and work anywhere in
the realm. Bolstered by an ideology of free trade and the demographic
imperative to settle new lands and move labour to where it was
needed, the movement of people within the Empire had been largely
unrestricted for much of the nineteenth century.13 Later, the free
movement of certain people within the empire came to be restricted.
Thus, flows of indentured labour from South India were subject to
more regulation from the late nineteenth century.14 And the white
dominions placed restrictions on Asian immigration from the early
twentieth century.15 By the late 1930s, some, though not all, British
colonies required passports for entry, but their primary purpose was to
keep out various classes of ‘undesirables’, ranging from ‘prostitutes’
and ‘habitual drunkards’ to circus troupes, rather than to restrict
12 Ann Dummett and Andrew Nicol,Subjects, Citizens, Aliens andOthers: Nationality and
Immigration Law (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1990); Daniel Gorman, Imperial
Citizenship: Empire and the Question of Belonging (Manchester: Manchester University
Press, 2006).
13 Randall Hansen, Citizenship and Immigration in Post-war Britain: the Institutional
Origins of a Multicultural Nation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 39. For
a study of the ideologies behind imperial immigration policy see, Gorman, Imperial
Citizenship.
14 Sunil Amrith, ‘Indians Overseas? Governing Tamil Migration to Malaya, 1870–
1941’, Past and Present, vol. 208, no. 1 (2010), pp. 231–261.
15 Marilyn Lake, and Henry Reynolds, Drawing the Global Colour Line.
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immigration per se.16 From the1920s, passports were required for those
entering India,17 but the colonial state willingly declined to enforce
its own rules, especially on land routes.18 Because colonial authorities
often neglected to police their borders, even non-British subjects could
enjoy relatively free movement within the British Empire. This meant
that it was fairly easy to come to live and work on the subcontinent for
those who had the financial means to do so.
Hyderabad had long been a desirable destination for migrants from
the far reaches of the subcontinent, as well as from Afghanistan,
the Arab world and even Southeast Asia. In the late eighteenth
century, Hyderabad became a centre of migration for Arabs from the
Hadhramaut, who worked as soldiers and scholars in the state.19 In the
early part of the nineteenth century, the Nizam of Hyderabad provided
refuge for Arab, Rohilla, Sikh and Pathan (Pashtun) mercenaries,
whom the British wished to expel after the defeat of the subcontinent’s
many warring states, including the Marathas.20 Once in Hyderabad
these migrants took up various professions, from trade and money-
lending, to employment in the Nizam’s army, or his special Arab
irregular forces, the Nazm-i Jamiat, the latter of which exercised
watch and ward duties over the palaces of the Nizam and his family.
Hyderabad actively recruited immigrants in some cases. When Salar
Jung I reorganised the Nizam’s administration in the second half
of the nineteenth century, for example, he brought in talented
administrators from North India, many of whom had been educated
at the Muhammedan Anglo-Oriental College in Aligarh.21 Hyderabad
16 For details on the rules in each colony see, Passport Control Manual, 1939,
India Office Records, British Library (hereafter IOR), L/P&J/8/745; Summary of
Visa Regulations, January 1947, IOR L/P&J/8/745.
17 Indian Passport Act (XXXIV of 1920), and Passport Rules, 1921, IOR
L/P&J/8/736.
18 Deputy Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign & Political Department,
to the Chief Secretary to the Government of Burma, the Chief Secretary to the
Government of NWFP, His Majesty’s Envoy Extraordinary & Minister Plenipotentiary
at the Court of Afghanistan, and the Agent to the Governor General and Chief
Commission in Baluchistan, 28 December, 1934, IOR L/P&J/8/736.
19 Omar Khalidi, ‘Sayyids of Hadhramout in Early Modern India’, Asian Journal of
Social Science vol. 32, no. 3 (2004), pp. 329–345.
20 Omar Khalidi, ‘The Hadhrami Role in the Politics and Society of Colonial India,
1750s–1950s’ in Ulrike Freitag and William G. Clarence-Smith (eds), Hadhrami
Traders, Scholars and Statesmen in the Indian Ocean, 1750s–1960s (Leiden: Brill, 1997),
pp. 67–81.
21 Francis Robinson,SeparatismAmong IndianMuslims: the Politics of theUnited Provinces’
Muslims 1860–1923 (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 26, 123–124.
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State thus accumulated a significant population of Afghans, Arabs,
and North Indians.22 Many migrants adopted Urdu as their language
and married locally, and their mixed descendents added yet more
diversity to Hyderabad’s population. In addition to these Muslim
migrants, the Nizam’s government also welcomed Kamma settlers
from the Telugu-speaking areas of Madras to bring uncultivated lands
in Telangana under the plough.23 At the same time, migrants did
not all move in one direction: a considerable number of weavers left
the state in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to settle
in the main weaving centres of Bombay province where demand for
their goods was higher.24 As a result, Hyderabad had become a rather
cosmopolitan place: its mixed population was supported by an official
ideology epitomized by Hyderabad’s court and nobility, which were
famed for their inclusiveness.25
This did not mean that Hyderabad’s population lived in perpetual
harmony; this mix did suffer occasional crises. Hyderabadis protested
against the entry of outsiders, or ‘non-mulkis’, into the services after
Salar Jung I recruited North Indians into the administration.26 In the
1850s, Arabs were deemed to be a ‘menace’ for their alleged involve-
ment in money-lending and the violence which often accompanied
the collection of loans. Hyderabadi and British authorities combined
to stem the problem: the British restricted the entry of Arabs at
the port of Bombay, and Salar Jung I established a special court
(Qadat-i Urub) to deal with cases involving Arabs.27 Nearly a century
later, after the Second World War, Arabs again found themselves
unwelcome in the state. The Nizam’s government asked the British
for permission to extern Arabs from the state, not only because of
22 See, Omar Khalidi, Muslims in the Deccan: a Historical Survey (New Delhi: Global
Media Publications, 2006).
23 A. Satyanarayana, ‘A Note on Land, Caste and the “Settler” in Telangana’ in
S. Simhadri and P. L. Vishweshwer Rao (eds), Telangana: Dimensions of Underdevelopment
(Hyderabad: Centre for Telangana Studies, 1997), pp. 30–34; and Inukonda
Thirumali,Against Dora and Nizam: People’sMovement in Telangana (New Delhi: Kanishka
Publishers, 2003).
24 Douglas Haynes, and Tirthankar Roy, ‘Conceiving Mobility: Weavers’ Migrations
in Pre-Colonial and Colonial India’, Indian Economic and Social History Review, vol. 36,
no. 1, (1999), pp. 35–67.
25 Karen Leonard, ‘The Hyderabad Political System and its Participants’, The
Journal of Asian Studies vol. 30, no. 3 (1971), pp. 569–582.
26 Karen Leonard, ‘Hyderabad: the Mulki non-Mulki Conflict’ in Robin Jeffrey
(ed.), People, Princes and Paramount Power: Society and Politics in the Indian Princely States
(Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1978), pp. 65–106.
27 Khalidi, ‘Hadhrami Role in the Politics and Society of Colonial India’, pp. 76–77.
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their alleged involvement in money-lending and drug use, but because
some members of the Nazm-i Jamiat had come into conflict with the
dominant political force in the state, the Ittehadul Muslimin.28
Independence, partition and Hyderabad
In 1947, as India and Pakistan gained independence, the princely
states were left in legal and political limbo.29 Hyderabad, like Kashmir,
chose not to join either of the two dominions.30 As the Nizam’s
government tried to negotiate its way out of joining the Indian
Union, Hyderabad’s cosmopolitan society faced several crises, from
a communist insurgency to the rising militancy of the Razakars,
who promoted Muslim rule in the state. Although Hyderabad was
not disconnected from developments in the rest of the subcontinent,
its politics had not crystallized along religious lines in the way that
all-India politics did in the months surrounding August 1947. But
as strife within Hyderabad escalated, the state was drawn into a
discursive interpretation of all-India politics which was dominated
by the experience of partition.
Hyderabad’s nascent internal politics were fragmented along
linguistic, caste and religious lines, but the state’s political divisions
did not directly correspond to those in the rest of India. Linguistic
affinities tended to define the major parties in the state, with separate
organizations for Kannada speakers and Marathi speakers, whilst
in the Telugu-speaking areas in the east of the State, the Andhra
Maha Sabha, with its communist agenda, was the dominant political
force. During the war, the communists in Telangana had begun
an insurgency against landlords and the forces of the Nizam that
continued after 1947.31 For its part, the Hyderabad State Congress
had pretensions to unite the entire state, but in effect its three
28 Extract from a secret note from W. V. Grigson, Revenue and Police Member,
H.E.H. the Nizam’s Executive Council, Hyderabad, [undated], NAI, MoS, f.117-
P(S)/47.
29 Ian Copland, ‘Lord Mountbatten and the Integration of the Indian States: A
Reappraisal’, Journal of Imperial andCommonwealthHistory, vol. 21, no. 2 (1993), pp. 385–
408.
30 On the failed negotiations to bring Hyderabad into the Indian Union see, Lucien
D. Benichou, FromAutocracy to Integration: Political Developments in Hyderabad State (1938–
1948), (Chennai: Orient Longman, 2000), Chapter 6.
31 Thirumali, Against Dora and Nizam.
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linguistic groups operated in relative autonomy from one another.
When the Nizam failed to accede to India by 15 August, 1947, the
Hyderabad State Congress launched a campaign designed to force
the Nizam to join the Indian Union that included both non-violent
protest and anti-government acts of violence.32 Language was not the
only fault line in Hyderabadi politics, however. By 1947 the Hyderabad
State Congress and the Andhra Maha Sabha were demanding that the
Nizam accede to the Indian Union. But both the main dalit parties, the
Depressed Classes Association and the Depressed Classes Conference,
had declared that they wished to stay out of the Union in order to avoid
being dominated by caste Hindus.
Finally, there was the Majlis-i Ittehadul Muslimin, which had
been established in 1927 and claimed to represent the interests of
Hyderabad’s Muslim population. At its inception, the Ittehad had
criticized the Nizam’s rule, and pushed for more representative
government, but on the basis that Muslims should rule Hyderabad.
By 1947, the party held significant influence over the Nizam. At
partition, the party supported both the creation of Pakistan and
the idea that Hyderabad should stay out of the Indian Union.33 As
communists and nationalists stepped up their own campaigns, the
Ittehad’s paramilitary volunteers, the Razakars, set about realising the
Ittehad’s pro-Muslim agenda with aggression against anyone whom
they considered to be an enemy of the regime. Of course, not all
Muslims were united, let alone united in support of the Ittehad: both
nationalists and communists counted Muslims amongst their ranks,
and there had been fighting between members of the Arab Nazm-i
Jamiat and members of the Ittehad.34 These squabbles were the source
of the attempt to deport Arabs, as cited above. Furthermore, many
government servants saw the spike in Muslim-chauvinist sentiment
inspired by the Ittehad and the Razakars as a betrayal, not only of
Hyderabad’s cosmopolitan ethos, but also of Islam.35
32 Swami Ramananda Tirtha, Memoirs of Hyderabad Freedom Struggle (Bombay:
Popular Prakashan, 1967), pp. 176–187.
33 Carolyn M. Elliott, ‘Decline of a Patrominal Regime: The Telengana Rebellion
in India, 1946–1951’, The Journal of Asian Studies, vol. 34, no. 1 (1974), pp. 27–47,
especially p. 35.
34 Extract from a secret note from W. V. Grigson, Revenue and Police Member,
H.E.H. the Nizam’s Executive Council, Hyderabad, [undated], NAI, Ministry of States,
f.117-P(S)/47.
35 Fareed Mirza, Tehsildar, to the First Taluqdar, Nander District, 15 July, 1948,
NAI, MoS, f.104-H/48.
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Although the fault lines in Hyderabad’s many internal conflicts did
not run neatly along religious lines, Hyderabad’s political situation
nonetheless came to be seen through the same lens as the disturbances
of partition in North India. The structure of rule in the state, where
a predominantly-Muslim government held power over large numbers
of the disadvantaged, many of whom were Muslim, but the majority of
whom were Hindu, appeared to divide the population along religious
lines. This was especially so as the Nizam’s forces, who were mostly
Muslim, descended to suppress the communists and nationalists, the
bulk of whom were Hindu.
In addition, two short-term trends increased the perception in
New Delhi that Hyderabad was a state run by Muslims for Muslims.
Firstly, the Ittehad and the Razakars, who wished Hyderabad to avoid
accession to the Indian Union consciously remoulded Hyderabad’s
image into that of a Muslim State. They attempted to recruit men from
across the Muslim world to fight to protect Hyderabad’s ‘Muslim State
against the invasion of Hindus’.36 According to Indian Government
documents, former members of Hyderabad’s army were sent to
Afghanistan and to Pakistan’s North West Frontier Province (NWFP)
to recruit forces to protect the state.37 In turn, the government of
Bombay refused entry to men from the Frontier and the Hadhramaut
on the ground that they were expected to travel to Hyderabad in
order to enlist in the Nizam’s forces.38 Secondly, thousands of Indian
Muslims sought the protection of the Nizam during the violence
of partition. The Nizam’s Palace in New Delhi was used to house
more than 1,500 Muslims who had sought shelter from the violence
which engulfed the capital in September 1947.39 And several hundred
thousand Muslims left India and established themselves in Hyderabad,
especially in Hyderabad City.40
36 D. K. Krishna, Assistant Director (States), Intelligence Bureau, Ministry of
Home Affairs to V. P. Menon, Ministry of States, 25 May, 1948, NAI, MoS, f.59-H/48.
37 Government of Central Provinces to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, New Delhi, 25
May, 1948, NAI, MoS, f.59-H/48.
38 Copy of telegram from Restis, Bombay to Homex, New Delhi, 9 April, 1948,
NAI, MoS, f.198-P/48; Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Home Department
to the Secretary to the Government of India, Ministry of States, 7 August, 1948, NAI,
MoS, f.59-H/48.
39 The Superintendent, H.E.H. the Nizam’s Palace, New Delhi, to the Political
Secretary, H.E.H. the Nizam’s Government, Hyderabad Deccan, 25 November, 1947,
APSA, Installment no. 70, list no. 6, serial no. 53.
40 Government estimates put the number of North Indian refugees in Hyderabad
at around seven lakhs, Note by Raja Dhondi Raj Bahadur, Minister for Rehabilitation,
5 August, 1949, NAI, MoS, f.10(27)/49.
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As the Nizam’s forces bore down more heavily on their opponents in
Hyderabad, and non-Hyderabadi Muslims gathered in the state, the
territory was drawn into an all-India narrative of partition. Although
each locality, indeed, each person, experienced partition in a unique
way, as Pandey has shown, these separate instances of violence were
often given larger significance as they were transposed into events of
national suffering. Thus, individual acts of violence became national
wrongs and entire communities were rendered undifferentiated and
suspect.41 The catastrophe of partition produced a postcolonial polity
in which political parties organized around Muslim interests were
almost completely discredited, and the loyalty of Muslims in India
was easily cast in doubt. These views informed the government of
India’s treatment of Muslims who wished to return to or remain in
India after partition.42 They also shaped the treatment of Muslims
amongst communities of overseas Indians in the remaining British
colonies, including Kenya.43 They certainly coloured interpretations
of the situation in Hyderabad, for the government of India concluded
that the unrest in Hyderabad threatened to destabilize ‘the communal
situation in the whole of India’, and decided to invade the state to
restore order.44 On 12 September, 1948, therefore, the government
of India launched its ‘Police Action’ in Hyderabad. In spite of the
name, the move really entailed a full scale military invasion of the
state. Although the formal invasion was concluded very quickly, the
state witnessed widespread anti-Muslim violence in its aftermath.
The official view of Afghans, Arabs and Pakistanis—Razakars
and outsiders
The fact that Hyderabad had been woven into that all-India partition
narrative by September 1948 was important because it informed the
way the government of India and the Military Governor in Hyderabad
viewed questions of belonging in the state after the invasion. Thus,
41 Gyanendra Pandey, Remembering Partition: Violence, Nationalism and History in India
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), Chapter 5.
42 Zamindar, The Long Partition, especially Chapter 3.
43 Deborah Sutton, ‘Divided and Uncertain Loyalties: Partition, Indian Sovereignty
and Contested Citizenship in East Africa,1948–1955’, Interventions vol.9, no.2 (2007),
pp. 276–288.
44 Note for the Cabinet by V. P. Menon, Secretary to the Government of India,
Ministry of States, May 1948, NAI, MoS, f.1(6) H, 1948.
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there was widespread distrust of Muslims in Hyderabad as Major
General J. N. Chaudhuri led Indian troops into the territory. As
Military Governor, Chaudhuri wanted to rid the state of non-
indigenous Muslims. There was a remarkable absence of debate in
government over whether this policy was legally permissible. Indeed,
in the lack of legal clarity which prevailed at the time, the idea that
non-indigenous Muslims may have had rights to residence or even
citizenship in India was not raised. Instead, everyday understandings
of belonging determined the fate of these men and their families.
Suspicion of Muslims dominated the Military Governor’s policy
from the inception of the occupation. As they swept into the state,
Chaudhuri’s forces arrested thousands of people: the Nizam’s military
forces were detained as they surrendered, and approximately 17,000
civilians were imprisoned on suspicion that they were engaged in
anti-Union activities. Chaudhuri explained, ‘Naturally, among those
arrested, the majority were Muslims . . . They had been pointed out as
Razakars by people who were, at that time, considered reliable’.45 In
the post-invasion lexicon, the term Razakar did not necessarily denote
only those who were members of the volunteer corps. Rather, it was
widely used to describe anyone suspected of Muslim chauvinism or
of opposition to the integration of Hyderabad into the Indian Union.
As Chaudhuri’s observation makes clear, it was widely assumed—
incorrectly—that most Muslims were Razakars.
By one non-official estimate, as many as 25,000 Arabs were jailed
in the aftermath of the invasion.46 A separate non-official source
suggested that around 2,500 Afghans were also held.47 According
to government figures around 6,22548 people described as ‘Pakistani
nationals’, who had worked not only in the Nizam’s forces but as petty
traders, shopkeepers, money-lenders, masons and mechanics, were
also detained in various camps around the State.49 The latter is a
particularly curious category given that the legal regime regarding
45 J. N. Chaudhuri, Military Governor, to the Deputy Secretary to the Government
of India, Ministry of States, 17 February, 1949, NAI, MoS, f.12(4)-H/49.
46 Note by Saif bin Sultan Husein bin Abdulla bin Umar Al Quaiti, LLM, MA,
[undated], National Archives UK, DO 142/441.
47 Translation of cutting from Afghan (Karachi), 10 February, 1949, NAI, MoS,
f.12(4)-H/49.
48 Minutes of a discussion held in the Ministry of External Affairs, Government
of India, with regard to the question of the repatriation of Pakistan Nationals from
Hyderabad (Deccan), [undated], NAI, MoS, f.10(12)-H/49.
49 Note by Jagat Singh, Ministry of External Affairs, 18 April, 1949, NAI, MoS,
f.10(12)-H/49.
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nationality was anything but clear at this time. The Military Governor
argued that it was ‘absolutely necessary to get rid of the Pathan
and Arab outsiders in Hyderabad as quickly as possible’.50 His
Government, in co-ordination with the central government, decided
to deport these men to their countries of origin. By one estimate there
were around 21,000 people to be deported,51 and most would have
to be kept in detention camps until they could be escorted from the
country.
As they were awaiting deportation, their families were also detained.
At this time, women and children under the age of 16 did not have
separate rights of nationality or domicile in international law. Instead,
their rights were legally bound to those of their husband or father.
Thus, the government made plans to deport the Indian-born wives
and children of these migrants. In the meantime, the men and their
families were held in detention camps, behind barbed wire and under
armed guard.52 Within a short time, many in the camps had spent
all their ready cash and were in dire straights. One group of former
members of the Nizam’s forces who were waiting to be sent to Pakistan
lamented that, ‘We have no clothes to cover ourselves and we have
no money to look after the other personal necessaries of life’. They
decried the conditions of the camp, writing, ‘The ladies are in a
very depressed state and shocked at their imprisonment in a barbed-
wire fence and separated from their husbands. . .The future of our
children is being ruined recklessly, as we are unable to educate them.’53
Chaudhuri, acknowledging the poor conditions in the camp, told the
Centre, ‘morale in Dhond camp [is] extremely low’, and he urged the
government of India to expedite the removal of the detainees.54
As it became clear that Indian forces had acted with excessive zeal in
detaining these Muslims on the assumption that they were Razakars,
new rationales were developed for their detention and removal from
the state. Writing of the Afghans, Chaudhuri stressed the fact that,
50 Foreign New Delhi to the Chief Secretary to the Government of Bombay, 14
October, 1948, NAI, MoS, f.175-H/48.
51 Southern Command Adm. Instr. no. 50, Repatriation Camp Dhond, 8 October,
1948, NAI, MoS, f.175-H/48.
52 Milgov Hyderabad State to Foreign New Delhi, 16 March, 1949 (received), NAI,
MoS, f.10(12)-H/49.
53 Q. Bahadur, Hav/Cl 8th Hyderabad Infantry and 21 others to the Military
Governor, Hyderabad, 19 March, 1949, NAI, Ministry of States, f.10(12)-H/49.
54 Milgov Hyderabad State to Foreign New Delhi, 16 March, 1949 (received), NAI,
MoS, f.10(12)-H/49.
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‘Afghan nationals here live mostly by money-lending’. The Military
Governor was willing to acknowledge that, ‘Though perhaps a greater
proportion of them did not take much part in the Razakar movement’,
he nonetheless insisted that, ‘some of them definitely did, while
others naturally used the Muslim domination obtaining at the time
for their own ends. As a result, they were possibly not the most
popular community in Hyderabad’.55 Even this new rationale—their
unpopularity as moneylenders—was not based on solid evidence, as
many Afghans were in fact businessmen and landholders.56 Similarly,
the Government in Delhi justified the removal of Arabs on the grounds
that, after having lost their jobs as the Nizam’s forces were disbanded,
many Arabs were unemployed, ‘without any means of livelihood and
with no prospect of future employment’. This, they reasoned, ‘would
constitute a constant threat to the law and order position in the
state’.57
The legal rights of those being held awaiting deportation were
unclear as the legal regime establishing citizenship and domicile rights
was in flux in the subcontinent, especially for individuals residing
in princely states. Before the introduction of the Constitutional
provisions regarding citizenship on 26 November, 1949 (two months
before the rest of the constitution) the old British Nationality and
Status of Aliens Act continued to apply in independent India, ensuring
that those in the former territories of British India remained British
subjects after the British had departed.58 The residents of princely
states, however, had not been British subjects, but rather, had been
British Protected Persons. They were, therefore, not covered by the
interim arrangements made for British India. When British suzerainty
over the princely states terminated on 15 August, 1947, residents of
princely states ceased to be British Protected Persons. The government
of Hyderabad did issue its own passports for a very brief time between
independence and the police action, but these were not recognized
55 J. N. Chaudhuri to N. M. Buch, Joint Secretary to the Government of India,
Ministry of States, 5 March, 1949, NAI, MoS, f.12(4)-H/49.
56 Note by B. K Kapur, Ministry of External Affairs, 17 February, 1949, NAI, MoS,
f.12(4)-H/49.
57 Note by S. Narayanaswamy, Deputy Secretary to the Government of India,
Ministry of States, 18 November, 1948, NAI, MoS, f.175-H/48.
58 S. K. Agrawala and M. Koteswara Rao, ‘Nationality and International Law in
Indian Perspective’ in Ko Swan Sik (ed.), Nationality and International Law in Asian
Perspective (London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1990), pp. 65–123, especially p. 71.
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by the government of India.59 When India invaded Hyderabad, the
people of the state did not automatically become Indian citizens. It
was not until the Citizenship Act of 1955 that persons belonging
to princely states were formally made citizens of India.60 The court
cases that retrospectively clarified what status individuals had before
the commencement of the constitution or the introduction of the
Citizenship Act were not heard until as late as 1955,61 meaning that
in the period immediately after the police action, the legal status of
the people of Hyderabad, including those in detention, was uncertain.
At this stage, therefore, formal legal rules about who had the
right to stay in India were less significant than ad hoc notions about
who belonged in India. In the reasoning of Chaudhuri and the central
government, it was easy to slide from more narrow considerations of
citizenship and residency, which centred on the question of loyalty, to
the idea that persons—or to be accurate, Muslims—who were involved
in certain professions or who were unemployed did not belong in India.
Moreover, this understanding was collective: at this stage, there was
no assessment of the merits of individual Afghans or Arabs—they were
judged as a whole.
These ad hoc assessments were, however, open to negotiation.
Representatives of the Arabs who were detained argued that they
did not deserve to be imprisoned or deported. They produced evidence
that Arabs, too, had been victims of Razakar attacks before September
1948, and that they had condemned the excesses of the Razakars and
Majlis-i Ittehadul Muslimin.62 The Nazm-i Jamiat, they protested,
had not engaged in the same activities as the Nizam’s other forces,
but had ‘served the good cause of the public without any distinction
of caste or creed.’63 And they asked to be given a status analogous to
that of Indians in South Africa. Largely with the help of General El
Edroos, head of the Hyderabad Army, who was himself of Arab origin,
Chaudhuri was persuaded to allow Arabs ‘who have settled down
59 S. Narayanswamy, Deputy Secretary to the Government of India, Ministry of
States, to the Ministry of Home Affairs, 27 May, 1948, NAI, MoS, f.75(2)-G/Hyd/48.
60 B. N. Rau, India’s Constitution in the Making (Calcutta: Orient Longmans, 1960),
p. 338.
61 Agrawala and Rao, ‘Nationality and International Law’, pp. 99–104.
62 Resolution of the Arabs of Jalsa against the Razakars, 21 February, 1945,
National Archives UK, DO 142/441.
63 Shaiks, etc. and representatives of the Arabs in Hyderabad to Major General
J. N. Chowdary [sic], Military Governor, Hyderabad, 7 November, 1948, National
Archives UK, DO 142/441.
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permanently in the State as peaceful citizens’ to stay, even though
they were ‘of non-Indian origin’.64 With El Edroos’ intervention several
thousand Arab families were permitted to remain in Hyderabad. This,
too, had less to do with rights of residence or citizenship than with an
informal understanding between two military men.
Repatriation and reciprocity
The Indian Government had originally proposed that detainees
be repatriated to their ‘home’ states without consultation with
the governments of Afghanistan, Pakistan, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia
or Aden. But the detention and proposed deportation raised
the prospect that any action to dispel these people would have
unpleasant consequences for Indian communities overseas. Scholars
have remarked upon the fact that the Congress and the government
of independent India, which the party led, seemed willing neither
to completely abandon nor unconditionally accept overseas Indians.65
The government of India ensured that commissioners were stationed
in British colonies with significant Indian populations, a move which
implied that it was unwilling to relinquish the influence it held over
these Indians abroad.66 And yet, Nehru personally urged overseas
Indians to take the citizenship of the place where they resided, and
warned them that they should not expect aid from ‘Mother India’.67
Unable to absorb more people after the influx of refugees from
partition, the government of India was eager to ensure that Indians
overseas did not have any reason to return. The presence of Indians
overseas, therefore, forced the government to rethink questions of
belonging in India itself.
There were clear indications in the press that the security of
Indians overseas may have been imperilled if Arabs and Afghans were
forcibly deported from Hyderabad. The Karachi-based newspaper,
64 Note by S. Narayanaswamy, Deputy Secretary to the Government of India,
Ministry of States, 18 November, 1948, NAI, MoS, f.175-H/48.
65 Sutton, ‘Divided and Uncertain’, John D. Kelly and Martha Kaplan, ‘Diaspora
and Swaraj, Swaraj and Diaspora’ in Dipesh Chakrabarty and Rochona Majumdar
(eds), From the Colonial to the Postcolonial: India and Pakistan in Transition (New Delhi:
Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 311–331.
66 Tinker, ‘Indians Abroad’, pp. 24–25.
67 Anirudha Gupta, ‘India and the Asians in East Africa’, in Twaddle, Expulsion of a
Minority, pp. 125–139, especially p. 128.
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Afghan, contrasted the proposed deportation of Afghans from India
with the fact that during the unrest surrounding partition in NWFP,
‘thousands of Hindus and Sikhs took shelter in the Holy Land of
Afghanistan’, and were helped, ‘materially and morally’ whilst there.
The paper protested, ‘we have no intention that we should incite the
feelings of the Afghan brothers to avenge Hindus and Sikhs residing
in Afghanistan. ‘But’, the paper continued in a sarcastic tone, ‘it is our
desire that our Afghan brothers should know the result of our kindness
and brotherly attitude towards Hindus and Sikhs’.68 The Al Nahda
newspaper in Aden published a letter addressing the Commission for
India in Aden warning that, ‘feeling in Aden and all the Arab world has
turned against you because of the worst treatment and brutal action
you have taken against the Arabs of Hyderabad especially against the
old and the children.’ Implying retaliation was not inconceivable, the
letter noted, ‘Hindus in Aden have lived a peaceful life in Aden among
the Arabs for a long time’. The paper asked the Commission to allow
the Arabs in Hyderabad to live ‘in the same way as the Hindus do
in Aden’.69 The implication was that the fate of the two immigrant
groups was tied, and that if Arabs were expelled from Hyderabad,
Hindus may be forced to leave Aden.
Seeing the displeasure which the prospect of deportation had
incurred abroad, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs fretted that forced
repatriation without consultation would be ‘bound to strain the
relations’ between India and these other governments. Above all,
the position of Indians in South Africa was a ‘very important
consideration’, according to the Ministry of External Affairs:
There is open talk in South Africa now of the repatriation of persons of
Indian origin to India. If the Government of India were to resort to a forced
repatriation of a large number of persons of non-Indian origin without any
reference to the Governments of the countries concerned, it is bound to be
quoted as a precedent against us in any future protest against repatriation
of Indians from South Africa.70
68 Translation of cutting from Afghan (Karachi), 11 February, 1949, NAI, MoS,
f.12(4)-H/49.
69 Translation of letter addressed to the Commission for the Bharat Government
in Aden, Al Nahda, enclosed in a letter from A. B. Commissioner for the Government
of India, Aden, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Ministry of External
Affairs, 1 December, 1950, NAI, MoS, f.19(5)-H/50.
70 Note by S. Dutt, Ministry of External Affairs, 15 December, 1948, NAI, MoS,
f.175-H/48.
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As a result, the deportations had to be delayed as the government
of India consulted the home governments of these families.
Here we can see that questions of citizenship and belonging in India
were not easily confined within India’s borders. Of course, historians
have long remarked upon the fact that notions of citizenship in
India were shaped by the experience of partition and the creation
of Pakistan. But the present research suggests that, although the
government of India had an ambivalent relationship with Indians
abroad, it was unable to ignore them when considering questions of
citizenship and domicile within India. Because the treatment of aliens
is so often reciprocal in international law, the presence of Indians
overseas affected the treatment of non-Indians within India’s borders.
Negotiating citizenship
Negotiated deportation, in turn, ran into difficulties because it took
place in the midst of a larger transition. The era of decolonization
witnessed the inception of a shift from an imperial regime, in
which persons could move relatively freely within the British Empire
without much documentation, to an international one that demanded
individuals provide documentary evidence to prove their citizenship.
But the emerging legal framework for governing nationality did
not square neatly with equally contemporary, but not necessarily
complementary, conceptions of nationality based on ethnicity. This
meant that persons who identified themselves (or were identified
by others) as Arab or Afghan did not necessarily meet the legal
requirements to be recognized as nationals of their ‘home’ countries.
Legal questions were not the only hurdle: the attempt to remove these
‘outsiders’ also foundered on the government of India’s larger political
concerns, especially the struggle over Kashmir.
Negotiations over repatriating Afghans in Hyderabad quickly turned
on the tensions between India and Pakistan over Kashmir. As soon
as the Ministry of External Affairs broached the subject of sending
Afghans home, the Afghan Chargé d’Affaires in Delhi warned the
government of India against creating ‘a sense of injustice’ rankling in
the minds of Afghans in Hyderabad. The Chargé d’Affaires reminded
the Ministry of External Affairs that Afghanistan did not wish its
own nationals to interfere in Kashmiri affairs, but those deported
would have to pass through Pakistan to get to Afghanistan, and ‘if
they were to leave Hyderabad in an angry and disgruntled mood they
98 T A Y L O R C . S H E R M A N
would become a prey to Pakistan propaganda’.71 Given the role that
Pashtun tribesmen from NWFP in Pakistan had played in escalating
the Kashmir conflict, the government of India was particularly keen to
avoid the possibility of adding Afghans to those fighting in Kashmir.72
The Afghan government agreed that men who had been in the Nizam’s
forces and ‘who had obviously no means of livelihood’ ought to be
returned, but asked ‘for special consideration for Afghan nationals
who had been coming to and living in India for scores of years’ to be
allowed to continue to ply their trades.73
Indeed, as a sign of his goodwill, the Chargé d’Affaires travelled
to Hyderabad to inform Afghans there, ‘about the true relationship
between India and Afghanistan, and to emphasize what benefits
Afghanistan was receiving from India and generally to persuade
them to behave themselves’.74 In return, the Afghan Government
persuaded the government of India to significantly alter its plans. As
a result, it adopted a policy of releasing all those Afghans ‘who were
well off and against whom there was nothing specific’.75 It allowed
Afghans being held in camps to return to Hyderabad, and decided
not to deport any Afghans from the State except ex-servicemen, those
‘involved or convicted in Razakar activities’76 and those ‘of undesirable
character’.77
Chaudhuri, acting as Military Governor, was adamant that this
much smaller group should be removed from the State, and asked
district police to draw up lists of those to be deported. In total,
various police authorities recommended that 30 Afghan families be
sent to Afghanistan. However, upon enquiry it was found that, ‘most
of the so-called Afghani-Afghan families have been resident in this
State for several generations and that all their present members
71 Note by K. P. S. Menon, Ministry of External Affairs, 3 November, 1948, NAI,
MoS, f.12(4)-H/49.
72 Chitralekha Zutchi, Languages of Belonging: Islam, Regional Identity, and the Making
of Kashmir (London: Hurst & Company, 2004), p. 306.
73 Note by B. K. Kapur, Ministry of External Affairs, 17 February, 1949, NAI, MoS,
f.12(4)-H/49.
74 Note by K. P. S. Menon, Ministry of External Affairs, 3 November, 1948, NAI,
MoS, f.12(4)-H/49.
75 Note by B. K Kapur, Ministry of External Affairs, 22 February, 1949, NAI, MoS,
f.12(4)-H/49.
76 Foreign, New Delhi to Military Governor, Hyderabad, 12 March, 1949, NAI,
MoS, f.12(4)-H/49.
77 J. N. Chaudhuri to N. M. Buch, Joint Secretary to the Government of India,
Ministry of States, 5 March, 1949, NAI, MoS, f.12(4)-H/49.
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are born-Hyderabadis owning extensive landed properties and having
business interests in the State, with no corresponding interests in
Afghanistan’.78 By the time these enquiries had been completed,
the Indian Constitution had come into force. Given that many had
been born in Hyderabad, they could claim Indian citizenship rights
under the Constitution. In light of this, the government of Hyderabad
concluded, ‘Though they may all be of Afghan origin, it will not be
possible to give satisfactory proof of their Afghan nationality to the
Afghan Government.’ As a result, only five out of 30 families could be
forcibly repatriated.79 However, on further enquiry it was found that
no member of these remaining five families was in possession of ‘any
passport or other travel documents’.80 The government of India asked
the government of Afghanistan if they would accept these families,
but received no reply.81
Similar difficulties arose when it came to sending Arabs back to
their countries of origin. Around three dozen of the Arabs detained in
a camp in Hyderabad city claimed to be from Saudi Arabia. The Saudi
authorities initially refused to issue the necessary identity certificates
to these men and their families. After General El Edroos intervened,
the Saudis were persuaded to issue certificates to 13 of them,82 but
declined to recognize the rest. The Saudi’s contended ‘that a mere
declaration by the Arabs that they are Saudi Arabians is not enough to
allow their entry into the country.’ They averred that, ‘The mere ex-
istence of a relative in Saudi Arabia does not imply that the applicants
themselves are Saudi Arabs’.83 They insisted on ‘more concrete proof’
to establish their claim to Saudi nationality. The remaining men were
unable to provide such proof, and the government of Saudi Arabia
refused to allow them entry, even on compassionate grounds.84
78 L. C. Jain, General Administration Department, Government of Hyderabad, to
S. Narayanaswamy, Deputy Secretary to the Government of India, Ministry of States,
16 February, 1951, NAI, MoS, f.17(14)-H/51.
79 Ibid., emphasis in original.
80 L. G. Rajwade, Chief Secretary to the Government of Hyderabad, General
Administration Department, to the Deputy Secretary to the Government of India,
Ministry of States, 29 May, 1951, NAI, MoS, f.17(14)-H/51.
81 See several reminder notes in NAI, MoS, f.17(14)-H/51.
82 A. H. Safrani, Under Secretary to the Government of India, Ministry of External
Affairs to the Consul for India, Jedda, 3 November, 1950, NAI, MoS, f.19(9)-H/50.
83 A. H. Safrani, Under Secretary to the Government of India, Ministry of External
Affairs to the Chief Secretary, Hyderabad Government, 30 January, 1951, NAI, MoS,
f.19(9)-H/50.
84 See file, NAI, MoS, f.19(9)-H/50.
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Finally, around 70 Arabs, most of whom had been in the Nazm-i
Jamiat and were detained in Hyderabad, reported that they wished to
be repatriated back to Indonesia, but this proved no simple task either.
Only 14 of these Arabs had a valid Dutch passport, while another 33
had an expired one. Another 28 people, did ‘not possess any passport or
travel document issued by the Dutch’.85 India did not expect the Dutch
government to oblige their request to consider taking in these men
and their dependents, as the government of India had lent its support
to Indonesian nationalists in their fight against Dutch colonialism.86
Moreover, the fact that many of the Arabs in Dutch Indonesia had also
sided with the Republic would not have provided any more impetus
for the Dutch to let them return.87 The Dutch government stalled
behind requirements for paperwork, and none of the Arabs had been
sent to Indonesia by the time the Dutch recognized the independence
of the Republic of Indonesia at the end of 1949. When the new
Indonesian government considered their subsequent applications for
Indonesian passports, they found that many of those being deported
had written on their application forms that their nationality was ‘Arab
Mohamadan’.88 Thus, the Indonesian Embassy replied, ‘It is evident
from the forms that they are neither Indonesians nor Indonesian-
Arabs, but they are definitely Arabs. Therefore the question of giving
them Indonesian passports and repatriating them to Indonesia by my
Government, does not arise at all’.89 Indonesia did, however, consent to
let these individuals apply for visas, if Hyderabad would issue identity
certificates for them.
These three examples tell us two things about the regime of legal
citizenship based on documentary evidence. First, in the absence of
identity papers of any kind, the documentary regime was entirely
85 Military Governor’s Office to the Deputy Secretary to the Government of India,
Ministry of States, 9April, 1949, NAI, MoS, f.10(11)-H/49; Military Governor’s Office
to the Deputy Secretary to the Government of India, Ministry of States,16April,1949,
NAI, MoS, f.10(11)-H/49.
86 Note by V. M. M. Nair, Ministry of External Affairs, 19 March, 1949, NAI, MoS,
f.10(11)-H/49.
87 Huub de Jonge, ‘Abdul Rahman Baswedan and the Emancipation of the
Hadhramis in Indonesia’, Asian Journal of Social Science, vol. 32, no. 3 (2004), pp. 373–
400, especially p. 391.
88 Office memorandum, Ministry of External Affairs to the Ministry of States, 27
May, 1950, NAI, MoS, f.10(11)-H/49.
89 B. A. Ubani, Official Secretary to the Embassy of the United States of Indonesia
to R. N. Saletore, Under Secretary, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India,
20 April, 1950, NAI, MoS, f.10(11)-H/49.
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reliant upon the self-identification of individuals. Thus, understan-
dings of citizenship as a legal right gained by residency and established
through written records contained within them conceptions of
nationality that relied on ethnic origin as a marker of belonging and
often directly conflicted with the requirements of the legal regime.
When individuals self-identified in a way that did not match legal
requirements, as in the case of the men who identified themselves
as ‘Arab Mohamadan’, individuals could be left stateless. Indeed, the
combination of documentary requirements for citizenship, and the
failure of state borders to map perfectly onto imagined nations, had
the potential to leave tens of thousands of migrants stateless.
Indeed, many of those whom the government of India had wished to
deport had no ‘home’ to be sent to, at least not in law. Thus, very few of
the ‘undesirable’ Afghans were deported. Similarly, after nearly three
years of negotiations with the Saudi government, around two dozen
men who claimed to be from Saudi Arabia could not be sent home.
The government of Hyderabad was left to conclude, ‘the presence of
these 23 persons in Hyderabad is not going to make any difference
to the state.’ And they too were released from detention.90 Another
27 Arabs from Indonesia were also freed when their deportation
could not be arranged.91 Thus, although the government originally
estimated 7,000 Arabs would be deported, less than 2,000 Arabs were
formally repatriated.92 Several thousand were left to either resettle in
Hyderabad or make their own way out of India.
Self-identification and subversion
Although many were unable to fulfil the legal requirements to prove
the nationality they claimed, and were technically stateless, this did
not mean that they were unable to move. Individuals could and did
90 Note by S. Narayanaswamy, Deputy Secretary to the Government of India,
Ministry of States, 21 March, 1952, NAI, MoS, f.17(31)-H/51.
91 S. Narayanaswamy, Deputy Secretary to the Government of India, Ministry
of States, to N. N. Iengar, General Administration Department, Government of
Hyderabad, 16 February, 1951, NAI, MoS, f.19(59)-H/50; N. N. Iengar, General
Administration Department, Government of Hyderabad, to S. Narayanaswamy,
Deputy Secretary to the Government of India, Ministry of States, 24 February, 1951,
NAI, MoS, f.19(59)-H/50.
92 G. V. Kitson to J. S. H. Shattock, 13 September, 1949, National Archives UK,
DO 142/441.
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change the way they self-identified in order to secure a better outcome
for themselves. Their eventual departure from India, however, relied
upon strategic neglect from India’s governments. Interestingly, the
authorities in India seemed willing to subvert the system in order to
facilitate the departure of these men and their families. Thus, in some
cases detainees were released from camps and allowed to disappear.
In other cases, government officers turned a blind eye to individuals
who changed the way they self-identified in order to leave India. The
creative negotiation of nationality was not limited to those who wished
to leave India. Indeed, many of those who remained used their status
as non-Indians to gain access to privileges within India.
Many migrants simply slipped through or were allowed to evade
India’s none-too-tight immigration controls. Thus, it was reported that
by the time Indonesia rejected their visa applications, around half of
the original population of Arab Indonesians had ‘proceeded to Aden
and Java of their own accord’.93 Indeed, several hundred Arabs made
their way from Hyderabad to Aden on their own initiative, often by
hitching a ride in boats used for the import of dates.94 The government
of India was not unaware of their travel. Indeed, the government
reportedly issued them with ‘a passport of sorts’ which, it was ordered,
would ‘be accepted for exit only’.95 Here officials in India actually
helped aliens to circumvent immigration controls. This takes us back
to the idea that informal understandings of belonging, as opposed to
the strict enforcement of legal rights, were crucial in determining the
ultimate ethnic mix of Hyderabad and India.
Others who could not be deported simply changed the way they
self-identified to their own advantage. For example, the government
of Hyderabad wished to send several thousand Arabs to either the
Eastern Protectorate or the Western Protectorate of Aden, but the
British authorities in Aden demurred.96 Their objections were less
concerned with legal niceties and more with material scarcity, as the
Eastern Protectorate was suffering a severe famine at the time. The
High Commissioner in India explained: ‘the problem of providing
93 Private Secretary to the Chief Minister’s Secretariat, Hyderabad to the Deputy
Secretary to the Government of India, Ministry of States, 25 March, 1950, NAI, MoS,
f.10(11)-H/49.
94 J. N. Chaudhuri to N. M. Buch, Joint Secretary to the Government of India,
Ministry of States, 16 February, 1949, NAI, MoS, f.175-H/48.
95 Ibid.
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India, Ministry of States, 15 July, 1949, NAI, MoS, f.10(11)-H/49.
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sufficient food for the existing population in this area is already over-
taxing local resources . . . any increase in this population might well
have really disastrous results’. He asked, therefore, that India delay
sending anyone to the Eastern Protectorate until the arrival of the
monsoon eased the food situation.97
Hyderabad’s Government was extremely eager to get these people
off their hands, given that they were being held in camps at
government expense.98 The government of India, therefore, prepared
a boat of 500 passengers to be sent to the Western Protectorate in
March 1949. When they docked, however, 390 proved to be from the
Eastern Protectorate. Worse still, ‘almost all the Hadramis who made
up the bulk of the total are from the famine stricken areas’.99 When
called upon to explain himself, Chaudhuri pleaded ignorance in the
case, writing that, ‘under the previous regime in Hyderabad very few
records exist regarding such Arabs and in many cases, information has
to be taken from the Arabs themselves’. He assured the government
of India that the military authorities had been ‘thoroughly satisfied
with the statements of the persons concerned that they belong to
the Western Protectorate’.100 Given the sudden rise in the number
of Arabs on their rosters who claimed to be from the Western
Protectorate, it is not beyond reason to assume that the Indian
authorities were complicit in this stratagem.
The flexibility of self-identification did not work so well for persons
being sent to Pakistan, however. Many of those detained as ‘Pakistan
nationals’ were in fact Muslims from India, who had given their
destination as Pakistan when they were arrested.101 The government
of Pakistan sent an officer to the camp at Dhond in Bombay Province to
assess the claims of individuals there to Pakistani nationality. Though
he approved more than 2400 for travel to Pakistan, several hundred
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were denied permits to move to Pakistan.102 Of those, 347 were
reported to be ‘Indian nationals (Muslims)’.103 Having been refused
transit to Pakistan, these families were released from detention. They,
too, were left to obtain a permit to migrate to Pakistan on their own.104
Those who were willing to remain in India, who numbered several
hundred, were returned to their homes. But this did not necessarily
end the ordeal for them. In at least some cases district magistrates
were ‘asked to maintain a look out for their arrival in their districts
and to keep them under surveillance for some time’.105
Others used their status as aliens to their advantage in India.
Those men and women of non-Indian origin who remained in
Hyderabad appealed to their embassies to redress grievances that
the authorities in Hyderabad had failed to remedy. When Afghans
resident in Hyderabad encountered several difficulties after the
occupation began, they appealed to the Afghan Embassy for help.
Several petitioned their Embassy to try to get compensation for the
losses they had suffered in the violence of 1948, or to regain possession
of property that had been stolen or occupied. Others, like the Pashtuns
who originated from NWFP, used their roots to profess loyalty to India
and assert their rights.
In one case, Ghulam Jan Khan asked the Afghan Embassy to help
him secure compensation for property damaged in a riot in 1951. The
authorities in Hyderabad found, however, that he had ‘been living in
Hyderabad since his birth and his forefathers had been in this State for
more than a hundred years. It was only a year after the Police Action in
Hyderabad that he, somehow, succeeded in obtaining a passport from
the Afghan Embassy and declared himself a non-Indian and an Afghan
National’.106 In this case, Mr Khan attempted to acquire non-Indian
nationality in order to gain privileges inside India that could only be
accessed through pressure from a foreign government.
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Another Afghan, Abdul Karim Khan, complained to the Afghan
Embassy that, ‘Every day Afghans are being arrested indiscrimi-
nately . . . on false and trumped up charges’. Once arrested, these
men often found that their movable property was looted and their
immovable property illegally occupied. Mr Khan conceded that
Hyderabad’s Military Governor, Major General J. N. Chaudhuri
was ‘ever ready to help us’, but alleged that, ‘local officers do not
co-operate with us and sometimes treat us with contempt’. He asked
the Afghan Ambassador to see to it that the Indian government ‘deal
with us fairly’.107 The Royal Afghan Embassy took up the question of
the arrests and the stolen and occupied property with the government
of India’s Ministry of External Affairs. The government of Hyderabad
issued a blanket denial of the general accusations:
It is incorrect to say that Afghan nationals in Hyderabad are receiving
treatment any different to that accorded to other citizens. The life and
property of Afghans in Hyderabad are safe and the Administration is making
a special point regarding their welfare.
He reiterated that ‘the majority of Afghans’ in Hyderabad were
moneylenders, and therefore unpopular. He suggested that this may
explain why false accusations had been made against them.108 The
question of belonging was not just a question of government policy:
Afghans were allowed to stay, but officers on the ground and other
members of the population had their own understanding of who
belonged, and could make life difficult for non-Indians who wished to
stay. Certainly, this quotidian understanding of citizenship was tied
up in being Muslim. The fact that these people were doubly marked as
‘outsiders’ may have emboldened their foes to try to get them arrested
and sent away.
A final example will serve to demonstrate the ways in which these
residents expressed their loyalty in order to assert their rights.
When a group of Pashtuns formed a ‘Pakhtoon Jirga’ and asked
the Collector at Aurangabad to help them secure compensation for
losses suffered during the post-police action unrest, they argued:
‘That their kith and kin . . . took an active part in the War of
Independence of India, by their whole-hearted support, helpless
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sacrifices, in the movement of Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan’. This
framed their appeal so as to profess their collective loyalty to
India. They then assured the authorities that ‘local Pathans never
took an active part in the political activities whatsoever and . . .
always remained as loyal subjects and thus enjoyed the confidence
of the Congress’. This positioned the group within the new, more
restrictive, limits of Muslim politics in post-partition India. As
the idea of political parties for Muslims lost legitimacy with the
formation of Pakistan, loyalty to the Congress, and, moreover,
a willingness to abandon all active participation in politics, was
the surest way to please India’s new rulers. Finally, the Pakhtoon
Jirga pointed to the contribution its members had played in
commerce, trade and agriculture, arguing that they had ‘always
proved as an asset to the Hyderabad State’.109 This suggests that
in quotidian understandings of the right of residency and therefore
rights of access to government services such as compensation
and restoration of property, it was understood that these rights
were dependent upon the perceived utility and loyalty of entire
communities of people. People of non-Indian origin thus found ways
of asserting their rights which used their status as outsiders to their
advantage.
Conclusion
Particularly in the years before the introduction of the Constitution,
informal understandings of belonging were more influential than
the enforcement of legal rights in determining whether non-Indian
Muslims could be citizens or residents of India. The question of
belonging was intimately tied to the experience of partition, even in a
territory like Hyderabad which was not directly split in the division of
the subcontinent. Whilst Hyderabadi politics did not parallel those in
north India which produced the partition, Hyderabad was nonetheless
viewed through the discursive lens of all-India polarization produced
by partition. Thus Indian Muslims were rendered parenthetical
citizens—‘Indian citizens (Muslims)’—because their presence in India
disrupted the narrative of partition in which religious affiliation and
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national loyalty were merged. Muslims who were not of Indian origin
were doubly marked as outsiders.
Nonetheless, these everyday notions of citizenship could come into
conflict with formal rules regarding nationality. In the transition
to a global system in which mobility was more closely regulated,
governments became more reliant on legal and documentary proof
of nationality. When Afghans and Arabs and Pathans were unable to
supply the proof required by their ‘home’ governments, they appeared
to be trapped between a legal regime with requirements they could not
satisfy and everyday understandings of belonging which would exclude
them from India.
Because the legal regime was reliant upon self-identification,
however, most of the men and their families had more freedom to move
than might be expected. Indeed, the creative use of self-identification
helped many to leave India if they so desired. Interestingly, officials in
India proved willing to either bend the rules or to strategically neglect
them in order to help get these men and their families out of the
country. This implies that informal conceptions of belonging could, at
times, have significant influence over government action.
Those Muslims of non-Indian origin who did stay found new ways
to assert their rights and to profess their loyalty in India. Some
used their status as foreigners to raise the profile of their claims
against Indian authorities. Others, like the Pakhtoon Jirga mentioned
above, exhibited notions of belonging which were bound neither
geographically nor demographically by the borders of the Indian state.
Indeed, this research suggests that the more bounded ideal of the
nation stalled on its way to ascendance. The strategic alliance with
Afghanistan over Kashmir ensured that the government of India
could not deport many Afghans. International obstruction ensured
that Arabs who could not be formally deported and who did not wish
to make their own way out of India would remain. As a result the
ethnic mix of Hyderabad (and therefore India) was more diverse than
had been originally envisioned in 1948. The presence of migrants and
the fact of migration ensured that the government of India had to
accept the presence of people of non-Indian origin in India, even as
their domestic calculations had to incorporate Indians overseas.
